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In this paper we study the link between elections, fiscal policy and economic 
growth/fluctuations. The set-up is a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model of growth 
and endogenously chosen fiscal policy, in which two political parties can alternate in power. 
The party in office chooses jointly how much to tax and how to allocate its total expenditure 
between public consumption and production services. The main theoretical prediction is that 
forward-looking incumbents, with uncertain prospects of re-election, find it optimal to follow 
relatively shortsighted fiscal policies, and that this lowers economic growth. The model is 
estimated using quarterly data for Germany, the UK and the US from 1960 to 1999. Our 
econometric results provide clear support for the main theoretical prediction. They also give 
plausible and significant estimates for the productivity of public production services, the 
weight which households place on public consumption services relative to private 
consumption and the time discount rate. Moreover, we find that changes in electoral 
uncertainty produce the longest lasting fluctuations in the European economies followed by 
the US. 
JEL Classification: D9, E6, H1, H5. 
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1. Introduction   
 
Over the past forty years there is mounting evidence in most OECD economies 
suggesting both secular and cyclical changes in the composition of government 
expenditure in favor of public consumption at the expense of public investment.
1 
Moreover, several authors (see e.g. Kneller et al. (1999), Alesina (1999) and Tanzi and 
Schuknecht (2000)) have suggested that these fiscal changes are possible contenders to 
explain lower than expected economic growth in recent decades.  In an effort to provide 
one possible description of the process leading to the observed fiscal outcomes, we develop 
a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model that examines the implications of electoral 
competition between incumbents and challengers for the choice of fiscal policies and in 
turn their impacts on aggregate growth and fluctuations. 
 
The literature on elections, fiscal policy and economic growth is rich and still 
growing (very good surveys can be found in Alesina et al. (1997), Persson and Tabellini 
(1999) and Drazen (2000)).  While there are several channels through which electoral 
uncertainty can affect policymakers’ behavior,
2 a central result of the theoretical literature 
is that uncertainty about remaining in office pushes incumbent politicians to follow 
relatively short-sighted policies and engineer electoral business cycles, which in turn result 
in inefficient macroeconomic outcomes.
3  However, the econometric evidence to date is 
rather mixed.  For instance, while there is some evidence of electoral effects on fiscal 
policy instruments, there is no evidence that this is translated into observed changes in 
macroeconomic activity (see Alesina et al. (1997, chapters 6 and 7) and Drazen (2000, 
                                                           
1 See e.g. Tanzi and Schuknecht (2000) and the references cited therein. 
2 See e.g. Drazen (2000, pp. 220-2) and Persson and Tabellini (1999, p. 1471) for a survey. More details will 
follow below. 
3 On the other hand, elections (or the fear of losing them) can work as a disciplinary device (see e.g. Drazen 
(2000, chapter 7.2)). For instance, they control the moral hazard of politicians, help voters to select the most 




chapters 7.3 and 11.6)).
4  More importantly, irrespective of the econometric results, there 
seems to be a gap between the theoretical literature and the final econometric specification.  
In particular, with few notable exceptions,
5 econometric estimations are based on simple 
autoregressive specifications in which various policy instruments and economic outcomes 
are regressed on lagged values, political dummies (e.g. election and partisan dummies) and 
measures of sociopolitical instability (e.g. government stability and regime changes).   
However, to more thoroughly evaluate the implications of electoral competition for 
economic policy and macroeconomic outcomes, it is important to formally identify the 
channel(s) through which electoral uncertainty affects policymakers’ behavior.  
 
To this end we construct and estimate a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium 
model of economic growth and endogenously chosen fiscal policy consisting of a private 
sector and two political parties. The private sector comprises a representative household 
and a representative firm.  The household consumes, works and saves in the form of 
capital. The firm uses capital and labour to produce a single good.  The political parties can 
alternate in power according to an exogenous stochastic reelection probability.
6  The party 
that wins the election forms a government that chooses economic policy during its term in 
office knowing that it might be out of the power in the future.  It also plays non-
cooperatively (Nash) vis-à-vis the out-of-power party.  By economic policy, we mean here 
                                                                                                                                                                                
following most of the related macroeconomics literature, we abstract from the benefits of electoral 
competition. 
4 Although there are several explanations for this (see Drazen (2000, pp. 244-6)), our reading of the literature 
is that this is still an open issue. 
5 Examples of papers which formally estimate theory-based models include: Alesina and Sachs (1988) for a 
partisan model of monetary policy for the US; Alogoskoufis et al. (1992) for a model of exchange-rate policy 
for the UK; and Lockwood et al. (1996) for a public-finance model for the UK. 
6 Assuming that re-election probabilities are endogenous (e.g. they depend also on the state of the economy) 
would not change our main theoretical results.  More importantly, the assumption that reelection probabilities 
are exogenous is deliberate, i.e. we want to examine how electoral uncertainty affects policy choices and the 
macro-economy.  Specifically, we will assume that the stochastic structure of our exogenous election process 
is first-order Markov.  Dixit et al. (2000) assume a similar exogenous political process and provide empirical 
support.  Note that this process reflects that there is persistence to political parties’ popularity and 
competence (the realization of which determine the election outcome) across terms of office (see also e.g. 




the income tax rate and the allocation of total tax revenues between public consumption 
services (which provide direct utility to households) and public production services (which 
provide production externalities to private firms and hence generate Barro (1990)-type 
long-term growth).  We solve for Markov policy strategies, and hence a Markov-perfect 
general equilibrium, in which optimal decisions depend on the game’s current position.  
An advantage of our modeling framework is that it allows us to distinguish the effects of 
electoral uncertainty upon economic policy from its effects upon macroeconomic outcomes 
in a unified general equilibrium setting.
7  Another advantage is that it allows us to obtain 
an explicit analytical solution for the general equilibrium, so that the model is easy to 
interpret, tractable and useful for formal econometric estimation.
8    
 
  Our main theoretical prediction is as follows.  When the expected probability of 
being re-elected decreases, the total government expenditure-to-output ratio (and the 
associated tax burden) increases, while the share of tax revenue used to finance public 
production services decreases.  Both fiscal policy instruments work in the same direction, 
so that - in general equilibrium - a lower re-election probability leads to lower economic 
growth.  Intuitively, when there is electoral uncertainty and the political parties do not care 
(or care relatively little) about the economy when out of power, they effectively face a 
quasi-finite time horizon.
9  The higher the electoral uncertainty (i.e. the smaller the 
                                                           
7 As Drazen (2000, p. 517) points out, it is necessary to estimate jointly the so-called “political” mechanism 
(the effect of socio-economic variables on the choice of policy instruments) and the so-called “economic” 
mechanism (the effect of policy instruments on macroeconomic outcomes). 
8 See e.g. Campbell (1994) for the advantages of analytical solutions especially in growth models.   
9 The mechanism is as in Lockwood et al. (1996). See Persson and Tabellini (1999, p. 1471) for a survey of 
the related literature, namely how electoral uncertainty induces more “myopic” fiscal policies.  Economides 
et al. (2003) have shown that, only if there are extra rents from being in power per se, the parties find it 
optimal to care relatively more about economic outcomes when in power, and it is this that generates typical 
electoral cycles.  Note that this mechanism is somewhat different from e.g. Rogoff and Sibert (1988) and 
Rogoff (1990) where the incumbent government manipulates policy instruments in an attempt to increase its 
re-election probability.  It is also distinct from e.g. Persson and Svensson (1989) and Alesina and Tabellini 
(1990) where the incumbent government uses strategically the state variables (e.g. public debt) to reduce the 




probability of being re-elected), the less they care about the future.  As a result, they 
choose shortsighted, inefficient policies.
10  
 
In our econometric work, we estimate the general equilibrium model by using 
quarterly data for Germany, the UK and the US over the period 1960 to 1999.  To this end, 
we employ constrained maximum likelihood using the Kalman filter.  In contrast to the 
calibration exercises conducted in the RBC literature, estimation of the model’s structural 
parameters not only allows us to assess their individual significance, but also to undertake 
dynamic inference when conducting the impulse response analysis.  Our econometric 
results provide clear support for the main theoretical proposition.  Namely, in all three 
countries, electoral competition pushes governments to follow short-sighted, inefficient 
fiscal policies (in the form of a high tax burden and a preference for non-productive 
activities with short-term benefits) and this is in turn detrimental for the macro-economy.  
 
Our main numerical results are as follows.  The productivity of public production 
services relative to private capital is highest in Germany (0.309) followed by the US 
( 279 . 0 ) and the UK ( 270 . 0 ).  The estimates for the weight given to public consumption 
services relative to private consumption are  385 . 0 ,  475 . 0  and  600 . 0  for the US, Germany 
and the UK respectively.  The estimates for the time discount rate are  954 . 0 ,  978 . 0  and 
986 . 0  for the US, Germany and the UK respectively.  Finally, persistence of political 
uncertainty is greatest in the UK ( 961 . 0 ), followed by Germany ( 918 . 0 ) and the US 
( 889 . 0 ).  The latter finding appears to be in line with business cycle stylised facts, i.e. the 
US cycle is the shortest followed by Germany and the UK (see, e.g., Zarnowitz (1992) and 
Woitek (1996)). 
                                                           
10 Svensson (1998) obtains a similar prediction in a model in which political instability pushes rational 




  The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 presents the theoretical 
model. Section 3 summarizes the data and the econometric methods employed.  Empirical 
results are presented in Section 4, while Section 5 contains our conclusions. Finally, 
algebraic details pertaining to the model are gathered in the Appendices.   
 
2.  The Theoretical Model  
 
In this section, we solve for the optimal decisions of households, firms and political 
parties.  The (Markov-perfect) general equilibrium solution will consist of a system of log-
linear dynamic equations, which jointly specify the paths of private consumption, private 
investment, government consumption and production services, the tax burden and the share 
of tax revenues allocated to government production relative to government consumption 
services.  That solution will be in terms of the predetermined capital stock and the expected 
values of exogenous electoral uncertainty.  The underlying setup is a two-party variant of 
Barro’s (1990) well-known model of long-term growth and optimally chosen fiscal 
policy.
11  The other difference is that here there are also public consumption services so 
that the incumbent party also chooses the allocation of total tax revenues between 
production and consumption services.
12  
 
2.1  Definition of equilibrium and how we are going to work 
 
The time horizon is infinite.  For simplicity, we assume that elections are held 
every time period.  In each period t, the sequence of events is as follows: first, current 
uncertainty is resolved; in turn, the in-power political party chooses economic policy 
                                                           
11 See also e.g. Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995, chapter 4) and Glomm and Ravikumar (1994, 1997).   
Benhabib et al. (2001) focus on the properties of optimal fiscal policy in this model.    
12 See also Park and Philippopoulos (2003, 2004) for growth models in which the government chooses the 
allocation of tax revenues to different activities (e.g. public investment, public consumption and 
redistributive transfers).  However, these models assume a single benevolent government that chooses 




during its term in office; finally, private agents make their allocation decisions.
13  We will 
solve the problem by backward induction: within each t, we will first solve the private 
agents’ optimization problem for any feasible economic policy; in turn, we will endogenize 
economic policy by solving the political parties’ optimization problem.  
 
We will solve the optimization problems of private agents and political parties by 
using the method of dynamic programming.  The solution will give Markov policy 
strategies and hence a Markov-perfect general equilibrium.
14  Thus, optimal policies will 
be subgame perfect and time consistent.  Further, when we form a non-cooperative game 
between the political parties, the parties’ Markov policy strategies will be a Nash 
equilibrium of that game.
15  
 
When exact analytical solutions cannot be obtained, we will use first-order Taylor 
approximations around the non-stochastic long-run values of the relevant exogenous 
variables.  Specifically, this will enable us to obtain approximate closed-form analytical 
solutions for the value functions in the dynamic programming problems of private agents 
and political parties.  Campbell and Viceira (2002, chapter 5) use a similar type of 
approximation to solve the Bellman equation in dynamic asset pricing models.
16  These 
approximations will hold in expected value - a certainty equivalence property.    
 
 
                                                           
13 Thus, all decisions are made after the current uncertainty is resolved, so that all economic agents can 
choose directly the value of next period’s state variables. This makes the solution to the dynamic 
programming problem simpler, see e.g. Stokey and Lucas (1989, p. 240). 
14 Following Fudenberg and Tirole (1991, pp. 513-5), a Markov perfect equilibrium is defined to be a profile 
of optimal strategies that are a sub-game perfect equilibrium and depend on the current state of the game 
only.  Specifically, optimal strategies depend only on the set of state variables that are payoff-relevant, i.e. 
they directly affect the current payoff function.  As is known, Markov strategies are without memory.  
15 See also Ljungqvist and Sargent (2000, chapter 6) for examples of what they call “Nash-Markov perfect 
equilibria”.  See below for details.   
16 As Campbell and Viceira (2002, chapter 5) explain, this is the same type of approximation used in e.g. 
Campbell (1993), but instead of using it to linearize the budget constraint, here we use it to solve the Bellman 
equation. Campbell and Viceira also discuss how various authors have suggested different approximate 




2.2  Behavior of households  
 







t h c u E ∑
∞
=
β                                                                                                             (1a) 
 
where  ct  and ht  are respectively private consumption and public consumption services at 
time  t ,  01 << β  is the discount rate, and  t E  denotes the mathematical expectation 
conditional on information known at t.  At time t, current and past values of all variables 
are assumed to be known.  For simplicity, the utility function u(.)  is additively separable 
and logarithmic:   
uc h c h tt t t (,) l o g l o g =+ δ                                                                                              (1b) 
 
where  1 0 ≤ ≤ δ  is the weight given to public consumption relative to private consumption.  
 
At time t, the household rents its predetermined capital, kt , to the firm and 
receives rk tt , where rt  is the market return to capital.  It also supplies inelastically one unit 
of labor services per time-period so that the labor income is wt .  Further, it receives 
profits, πt.  Thus, the household’s budget constraint is:   
() ( ) kc r k w t t t t ttt + +=− ++ 1 1 θπ                                                                                    (2) 
 
where  1 + t k  is the end-of-period capital stock and  1 0 < < t θ  is the income tax rate.  For 
simplicity, we assume full capital depreciation (implying that the end-of-period capital 
stock is equal to investment).  The initial capital stock, k0 , is given.  
 
The household acts competitively by taking prices, tax policy and public services as 
given.  From the household’s viewpoint, the state variables at time t  are the predetermined 
capital stock, kt , and current economic policy.  As is shown below, the independent 




revenue used to finance public production services,  t b .  Therefore, let  () t t t b k V , ;θ  denote 
the value function of the household at any t .
17  This function satisfies the Bellman 
equation:  
() ( ) [] 1 1 1 ,   ; log log max , ;
1   ,
+ + + + + =
+
t t t t t t k c t t t b k V E h c b k V
t t
θ β δ θ .                                             (3) 
 
Using (2) for ct  into (3), the first-order condition for kt+1 and the envelope 
condition for kt  are respectively:
18  
() 1 1 1 , ;
1
+ + + = t t t k t
t
b k V E
c












, ; .                                                                                                (4b) 
 
2.3  Behavior of firms   
As in the literature introduced by Barro (1990), we assume that public services 
provide production externalities to private firms.  We also assume that technology at the 
firm’s level takes a Cobb-Douglas form.
19  Thus, the production function of the 
representative firm is:   
α α α − − =
1 1
t t t t g l Ak y                                                                                                            (5) 
 
where  t l  is the labor input at t ,  gt  is public production services at t,  A>0 and 01 < < α  
(we assume that aggregate productivity,  A, is constant so as to focus on growth and 
fluctuations driven by electoral uncertainty).  
                                                           
17 As is known, with logarithmic preferences, Cobb-Douglas constraints and full depreciation, explicit 
closed-form solutions for the optimal controls,  t c  and  1 + t k , can be easily obtained by assuming that controls 
are time-invariant functions of the current state and using these conjectures into the Euler equation (see e.g. 
McCallum (1989, pp. 21-22)). Here, we choose to use dynamic programming to cope with any possible 
complications arising from the presence of the exogenous (from the viewpoint of private agents) stochastic 
policy instruments,  t θ  and  t b .  It is easy to show that the solutions for  t c  and  1 + t k  (see (10a)-(10b) below) 
are the same independently of the solution technique.  On the other hand, here we also obtain an approximate 
solution for the value function in (3) (details will be given in Appendix A). 























The firm maximizes profits, πt, given by:   
t t t t t t l w k r y − − ≡ π .                                                                                                        (6) 
 
The firm also acts competitively by taking prices and public services as given. The 
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= .                                                                                                              (7b) 
 
2.4  Government budget constraint   
At each time t , the government runs a balanced budget by taxing the household’s 
income at a rate  1 0 < < t θ .
20  Thus,   
() hg r kw ttt t ttt += ++ θπ .                                                                                           (8a) 
 
 
Without loss of generality, we assume that a share  1 0 < < t b  of total tax revenues 
finances public production services, gt, and the rest  1 ) 1 ( 0 < − < t b  finances public 
consumption services, ht.  Thus, (8a) is decomposed into:   
() t t t t t t t w k r b g π θ + + =                                                                                                 (8b) 
 
() ( ) t t t t t t t w k r b h π θ + + − = 1                                                                                          (8c) 
 




                                                                                                                                                                                
19 The firm is modeled as in Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995, chapter 4). 
20 For simplicity, there is no public debt in the model since adding one more state variable would not change 
our main results (see e.g. Devereux and Wen (1998) who employ a similar setup). RBC papers that also omit 
public debt include Baxter and King (1993), McGrattan (1994), Ambler and Paquet  (1996) and Klein, 
Quadrini and Rios-Rull (2003).  Finally note that in a public finance model including debt, Lockwood et al. 
(1996) have shown that short-sighted fiscal policies - driven by electoral uncertainty - are also reflected into 




2.5  Competitive decentralized equilibrium (for given economic policy)   
 
Given the time-path of economic policy 
∞
=0 } , { t t t b θ , a competitive decentralized 
equilibrium (CDE) is defined to be a sequence of allocations 
∞
= + 0 1 } , ,   , { t t t t t g h c k  and prices 
{, } rw tt t   =
∞
0 such that: (i) households maximize utility and firms maximize profits by taking 
prices, policy and public services as given; (ii) all budget constraints are satisfied; (iii) all 
markets clear.
21  This CDE is described by equations (1)-(8) above.  The rest of this 
subsection will take advantage of the specific functional forms used to obtain a convenient 
closed-form solution for the CDE.   
 
Consider the economy-wide output.  Using (7a), (7b) and (8b) into (5), we find:  
 




= + + =
1 1
                                                                                 (9) 
 
which shows that the model is a variant of the linear  AK  model.  As in e.g. Barro (1990), 
the coefficient “ A” is a function of policy instruments.
22   
Then, Appendix A shows:
23   
 
Result 1: In a competitive decentralized equilibrium (for any feasible Markov economic 
policy), optimal private consumption and capital accumulation are:    
() () ( ) t t t t t k b A c α
α




1 1                                                                                 (10a) 
() ( ) t t t t t k b A k α
α




1 1 .                                                                                    (10b) 
 
                                                           
21 In the labor market, the market-clearing condition is  1 = t l . 






t t t b A r , which is the return to capital that drives private 













1 0 < <α , the social return to capital exceeds the perceived or private return. Thus, under production 
externalities, the decentralized growth rate is inefficiently low. 
23 As Appendix A shows, by taking first-order Taylor approximations around the long-run values of the 




It is also useful for what we do next, to write the solutions for the two types of 
public services, gt and ht , in a CDE.  Using (9), (8b) and (8c) become respectively:   
t t t t k Ab g α θ
1
) ( =                                                                                                            (10c) 
 






− = .                                                                                             (10d) 
 
To summarize results so far, equations (10a), (10b), (10c) and (10d) give ct ,  kt+1, 
gt and ht  respectively in a CDE.  This is a function of the predetermined capital stock,  t k , 
and the current policy instruments, θt and  t b , only.  The next subsection will endogenize 
the choice of θ t  and  t b .
24  
 
Before we move on to choose economic policy, notice two features of the CDE.  





+1  is the sign of  ). 1 ( t θ α − −  If () 10 −− > α θt ,  kt+1 
increases with θ t ; if  0 ) 1 ( < − − t θ α ,  kt+1 decreases with θ t .  Thus, the effect of the tax 
rate on the growth rate is an inverse U-curve, as in Barro (1990).










.  Thus, a higher share of tax revenues used to finance public production services 




                                                           
24 Here we do not model voting behavior.  We also assume that private agents are indifferent over which 
party wins the election (this is not restrictive because we will solve for symmetric equilibria). All this means 
that elections can affect the CDE only indirectly via the choice of economic policy, 
t θ  and 
t b .  This is 
deliberate since our focus is on the implications of electoral uncertainty.  For voting behavior, see e.g. 
Persson and Tabellini (2000, chapter 4.5).   
25 Intuitively, when the tax rate is initially low, any marginal increase will lead to higher tax revenues and 
higher public production services which increase the productivity of private capital; this more than offsets the 




2.6  The electoral system, political parties and definition of political equilibrium   
To endogenize economic policy, we form a non-cooperative (Nash) game between 
two political parties, denoted by i and  j , which alternate in power according to an 
exogenous stochastic reelection probability.
26  Specifically, if elections take place in each 
time-period, we assume that the party in power at t  has a probability  1 0 1 ≤ ≤ + t q  of 
winning the next election and remaining in power at t +1, and a probability  ) 1 ( 1 + − t q  of 
losing the election and being out of power at t +1.  In other words,  1 + t q  denotes the 
probability that the incumbent wins the election.  
 
To specify the motion of  1 + t q  we assume that it follows an exogenous first order 
autoregressive process.  Thus,   
10 1 tt t qqq ρ ε ++ =+ +                                                                                                        (11) 
 
where 0 0 > q  is a constant,  1 0 < < ρ  is the autoregressive parameter,  t ε  is  ) , 0 (
2 σ IID  
and 1 0 ≤ ≤ t q  for all t.
27  That is,  t q  is a non-negative stochastic variable that is bounded 
from above with probability 1.    
 
Given the above, a political general equilibrium is defined as follows: (i) The 
elected party i chooses  t θ  and  t b  to maximize the utility of the representative household 
                                                           
26 Assuming that re-election probabilities depend also on the state of the economy would not change our 
main theoretical results.  For instance, assume that the reelection probability is a positive function of recent 
economic growth.  This would give an incentive to the incumbent party to follow more long-sighted policies 
(so as to stimulate growth and increase its chances of reelection) than in the case in which the reelection 
probability is exogenous.  However, it would still be the case that, since the reelection probability is less than 
one, policies are less long-sighted than in the case without electoral uncertainty.  
27 We include a constant, 
0 0 q > , since otherwise the mean of 
t q  would be zero, which is counter intuitive in 
the case of reelection probabilities given that electoral uncertainty is always present. Also note that the 
autoregressive process we have chosen is consistent with previous empirical studies. For instance, when Price 
and Sanders (1994) examine the determinants of government popularity in post-war Britain, they find 
evidence of substantial history-dependence in popularity.  Finally, note that while the theoretical model can 
be solved using higher order processes for q, we find in our econometric estimation below that only first 
order terms are significant.  To preserve space, these results are not reported here but will be made available 




in (1a)-(1b) subject to the CDE summarized by (10a)-(10d), and by taking as given the 
policy of the other party,  i j ≠ , which may be in power at t +1.  That is, the in-power 
party plays Nash vis-a-vis the out-of-power party.  The out-of-power party takes no action 
until it wins an election.  (ii) We solve for Markov policy strategies, i.e. θt and  t b  can be 
functions of the current state of the game.  (iii) We solve for a symmetric Nash equilibrium 
in Markov policy strategies, i.e. parties’ policies will be symmetric ex post.
28  (iv) We 
assume that political parties do not care about the economy when out of power. Implicit 
here is the assumption that they earn extra rents when in power.
29  (v) The solution for θt 
and  t b , in combination with the CDE above, will give a Markov-perfect political general 
equilibrium.  
 
2.7  Problem formulation and chosen fiscal policies   
Recall that all current and past values are known at the beginning of t.  Then, from 
the political parties’ viewpoint, the state variables at t are the economy’s inherited capital 
stock  kt , and the current value of the exogenous  ) 1 ( AR  shock,  t q .
30  Therefore, let 
) ; ( t t
P q k V
i  and  ) ; ( t t
N q k V
i denote the value functions of party i at time t when in 
power and when out of power respectively (party  j ’s problem is symmetric).  These value 
functions must satisfy the following pair of Bellman equations:
31   
 
() ( ) ( )( ) [ ] [ ] 1 1 1 1 1 1
,




t t t t
b
t t








     (12a) 
 
                                                           
28 Thus, there are no partisan effects. Here, the focus is on the effects of electoral uncertainty.  Note that 
partisan effects do not have a persistent impact on growth [for evidence, see e.g. Alesina et al. (1997)].  
29 This is for simplicity.  Our results do not change if we assume that parties care less about the economy 
when out of power than when in power.  See Economides et al. (2003) for the micro-economic determinants 
of these political preferences in a similar setup.  See also Lockwood et al. (1996) for references from the 
political science literature that support this approach. 
30 Since  t k  and  t q  are the payoff-relevant state variables, this selection of state variables is consistent with 
the definition of Markov strategies (see also Appendix B). 








t t t t
N q k V q q k V q E q k V
i i i β                                    (12b) 
 
where ct , kt+1 and ht  follow (10a), (10b) and (10d) respectively.  Notice that in (12a), the 
incumbent has a probability  1 + t q  of remaining in power, and a probability  ) 1 ( 1 + − t q  of 
losing the coming election.  In (12b), the party out of power knows that there is a 
probability  1 + t q  of continuing to be out of power and a probability  ) 1 ( 1 + − t q  of coming 
back to power in the next election.  When out of power, parties do not care about macro 
outcomes; hence the zero term on the right hand side of (12b).  In (12a), all policy 
instruments are chosen by the incumbent party i, while in (12b) all policy instruments are 
those of party  j  since party i is out of power.
32  Finally, notice that the optimization 
problem in (12a)-(12b) has a recursive structure.
33   
          Then, Appendix B shows:
34 
 
Result 2: In a Markov-perfect general equilibrium of a symmetric Nash game between the 
political parties, the income tax rate,  t θ , and the share of total tax revenues used to 
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1 1  because party i  has been in power at t , while in (12b) 
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1 1  because party  j  has been in power at t .    
33 It is recursive in the sense that, given the other party’s policy choices, current policy choices affect returns 
dated  t  and later but not earlier (see Sargent (1987)).  In a recursive formulation, optimal policies are time 
consistent (see also Ljungqvist and Sargent (2000)).   
34 As before, to obtain closed-form analytical solutions for the value functions defined in (12a)-(12b), we use 
first-order Taylor approximations around the long-run value of the exogenous variable,  t q . See Appendix B 
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In what follows, we focus on the effects of electoral uncertainty, as summarized by 
the expected re-election probability,  1 + t tq E .  The expected “effective discount rate”, 
defined as  1 + Ωt t E , increases with  1 + t tq E .  In other words, as the probability of being 
reelected increases, policymakers care effectively more about the future. In turn, (13a) and 


















.  In other words, as the probability of being 
reelected increases, the total government expenditures-to-output ratio (and the associated 
required tax rate,  t θ )
36 decreases, while the share of tax revenues earmarked for financing 
government production services,  t b,   increases.  Then, since  () ( ) α
α










decreasing in  t θ  and increasing in  t b  along the optimal path,
37 it follows that, as  1 + t q  
                                                           
35 Notice three features of the solution in (13a)-(13b).  First, if  t q  is constant, it is optimal to keep the policy 
instruments flat over time.  This is as in the basic Barro (1990) setup, in which the optimal open loop tax rate 
that maximizes the utility of the representative agent (or equivalently the growth rate) is flat over time and 
there is no time inconsistency problem (for details, see Benhabib et al. (2001)).  Second,  ) 1 ( α θ − > t , where 
) 1 ( α −  is the productivity of public services.  By contrast,  ) 1 ( α θ θ − = ≡ t  in Barro (1990).  This is because 
here there are also public consumption services and electoral competition; both lead to larger public sectors 
and higher tax rates.  Third, the two policy instruments,  t θ  and  t b , should move in opposite direction in each 
period.  Intuitively, when the government allocates a larger share of tax revenues to public production 
services (i.e.  t b  increases), it can afford a lower tax rate (i.e.  t θ  decreases) since public production services 
stimulate private investment and hence increase the tax base.  Thus,  t θ  and  t b  are substitutes along the 
optimal path (see also Park and Philippopoulos (2003)).   








37 Since  0 ) 1 ( < − − t θ α  along the optimal path, it follows from (10b) that  1 + t k  decreases with  t θ . 
Intuitively, when policy is chosen endogenously, it is not possible for any further increases in tax policy 




increases, both policy instruments work in the same direction leading to an increase in 
capital and output growth.   
 
The intuition is as follows.  When there is electoral uncertainty (in the sense that 
there is a non-zero probability of being out of power in the next election), and the political 
parties care less about economic outcomes when out of power than when in power, they 
face a quasi-finite time horizon (see also Lockwood et al. (1996)).  As a result, the party in 
power, which is the party that sets policy, cares effectively less about the future. 
Specifically, the higher the electoral uncertainty (i.e. the smaller the probability of being 
re-elected), the less it cares about the future.  In our model, higher electoral uncertainty 
pushes policymakers to go for a higher total expenditures-to-output ratio and also spend 
more on non-productive activities relative to productive activities. Here, the benchmark 
case is the second-best case without any electoral uncertainty,  1 1 = + t q . In turn, the effects 
of these two policy instruments work in the same direction and discourage private capital 
accumulation and economic growth. We summarize results in the following proposition:   
 
Proposition 1: There is a unique Markov-perfect general equilibrium in symmetric Nash 
strategies among political parties. In this equilibrium, when the probability of being re-
elected decreases, it is optimal for incumbent politicians to follow relatively shortsighted 
fiscal policies (in the form of relatively high total expenditure-to-output ratio and low 
share of tax revenues used to finance government production services) and this is 
detrimental for economic growth.  
 
3.  The Econometric Model  
 
In this section we jointly estimate the general equilibrium (GE) model given the 
exogenous process for  t q  developed in Section 2 for Germany, the UK and the US using 
quarterly data from 1960 to 1999.  The GE model consists of equations (10a-10d) and 




exogenous process for  t q  is given by equation (11).  The internal and external dynamics of 
the model are captured respectively by the capital stock,  t k , and the reelection probability, 
t q . To focus attention on the effects that political uncertainty has on policy outcomes and 
in turn the aggregate economy, we have only specified one explicit stochastic process, 
namely  t q .  When moving to the econometric specification, we have to account for the fact 
that our data measures for  t q  are at best proxies.  This is because actual  t q  embodies 
multiple dimensions of electoral certainty and political stability in general, which make it 
different from the  t q  implied by the model (i.e. the “probability of staying in office”).  The 




Given that the model in (10a-10d) and (13a-13b) is non-linear, both in variables 
and parameters, prior to estimation, we transform it into its log-deviations form by using 
the long-run restrictions imposed by the theory developed in Section 2.  This has two 
advantages: (i) the transformed model is in a form more tractable for estimation, i.e. it 
becomes log-linear (with the non-linearity only entering in the parameters); (ii) the log-
linear structure is necessary when using the Kalman Filter.  The latter procedure is a 
natural choice for this exercise since, as mentioned above, we need to account for both 






                                                           
38 This treatment is particularly relevant when it comes to the distinction between government consumption 
and production services,  t h  and  t g .  Typically, national income accounting practice fails to recognise the 
investment characteristics of many categories of government expenditure. Examples include expenditure on 
education, or expenditure on social security programs.  This is widely recognized in the literature (see e.g. 




3.1  The Data  
 
The quarterly time series for private and public consumption and investment are 
from the OECD Business sector database.  As mentioned above, since it is not possible to 
measure the probability of staying in office directly, we have to use proxies for  t q . In the 
case of the UK and Germany, the political data are from the data-set collected by 
Carmignani (2003).  Since we do not have a direct measure for the probability of staying in 
office, we convert the information from Carmignani’s measures for political uncertainty to 
an index varying between 0 and 1, e.g.  )) ~ exp( 1 /( ) ~ exp( t t t q q q + = .  Our choice of measures 
is based on data availability: for Germany, we use an index of portfolio volatility and 
ideological diversity of the cabinet; for the UK, we use the share of parliamentary support.  
Portfolio volatility measures the number of changes in the structure of portfolio allocation 
between two consecutive cabinets.  The lower the portfolio volatility, the higher the 
probability a minister stays in office.  Ideological diversity reflects the potential conflict of 
interest between coalition partners, based on the ideological location of the parties 
involved in the coalition on a ten points Left-Right continuum (see Carmignani (2003) and 
the reference cited therein for details).  The more diverse the coalition, the smaller is the 
probability of staying in office.  In the case of the UK, and since the UK is a typical single-
party majority system, we cannot use measures based on potential conflicts within a 
coalition.  Instead, we will use the share of parliamentary support (share of seats controlled 
by the government) as a proxy for the survival probability.  In the case of the US, we have 
(relatively more direct) data on the presidential job approval for the entire observation 
period collected by the Gallup Organization,
39 which we convert from the bi-weekly to the 
quarterly frequency.  
                                                           
39 Source: http://roperweb.ropercenter.uconn.edu/.  We are aware that similar data exist for the UK and 
Germany, but using this would restrict the sample size considerably.  For example, in the case of Germany, 




3.2    The Model in log-deviations form  
Taking logs in (10a-10d), (13a-13b) and (11) and differentiating with respect to 
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,  () , , , ckg h are deterministic quadratic trends of (,  , ,) ckg h from 





                                                           
40 The value of  5 . 0 = q  reflects that it is not reasonable to expect either an incumbency advantage or 




3.3  The Kalman Filter set-up 
 
To estimate the parameters, we first cast the model in equations (14a) – (14g) in 
state space form.  The transition equation system is given by the economic model and 
determines the dynamics of the (7×1) state vector at: 
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In the measurement equation, the state vector is linked to observable 
12 ˆˆ ˆˆ ˆ ,  ,  ,  , and   tt tt t ck gh q ++ : 
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εt ∼ N(0, H), and the variance-covariance matrix H is assumed to be diagonal.  We do not 
require proxies for  ˆ ˆ  and  tt b θ , since they can be linked via the  1 ˆ ˆ and   tt ck +  equations to 
observable data. The error vector reflects the fact that all variables in the system are subject 
to measurement error, or have to be seen as proxies, as in the case of  2 ˆt q + . 
 
3.4  Constrained Maximum Likelihood 
 
Given that the parameters (i.e.  ,  ,  ,  ,  abcde   ) are comprised of complex non-linear 
convolutions of the underlying “deep” parameters ( ρ δ β α , , , ), which also embody the 
within- and cross-equation restrictions imposed by the theory, we find it appropriate to 
employ constrained maximum likelihood estimation.  Maximizing the likelihood function 
using standard numerical methods in these circumstances does not guarantee that the 
estimated parameters will lie within the ranges suggested by the theory. To ensure this, we 
could use parameter transformations such as  b=exp(a)/(1+exp(a)) which ensures that b 
lies in [0,1] interval.  However transformations such as these lead to problems with 
convergence (see Schoenberg (1997)). Accordingly, we will restrict the structural 
parameters  β α, a n d  δ  to stay within acceptable ranges (see below).  
 
Before we move on, it is important to point out that, in contrast to standard 
calibration exercises, our proposed methodology has several advantages.  First, we are able 
to assess the individual statistical significance of each of the structural parameters.   




dynamics and long-run effects of changes in political uncertainty, we are able to undertake 
dynamic inference. 
 
To estimate the state space model given by (15) and (16), we calculate the 
likelihood function using the Kalman filter.  As discussed above, when maximising the 
likelihood, we take into account that all of the variables (with the exception of ρ ) are 
bounded.  The restricted ranges we use are as follows: α  (i.e. the productivity of private 
capital relative to public production services) is in between 0.6 and 0.8, β  (i.e. the time 
discount rate) lies in between 0.95 and 0.99, and δ  (i.e. the weight given to public 
consumption services relative to private consumption) cannot be greater than 1 or less than 
0.
41   
 
  The range for α  was motivated by Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995, see e.g. pp 82-
87), who undertake calibrations using a point estimate of  75 . 0 = α  for private capital.  
They argue that a value around 0.75 (which is higher than the one usually used) gives 
reasonable transitional dynamics, generates predictions that accord well with historical 
growth experiences in advanced economies and is consistent with a broad measure of 
private capital.  The range for β  reflects values most often used in the theoretical DSGE 
literature (see, e.g. Baier and Glomm (2001) and Lansing (1998) who set β  to 0.98 and 
0.96 for the US respectively).  Finally, concerning the range for δ , since as Baier and 
Glomm (2001) state, “little is known about this value”, we employ the 0 to 1 range. Note 
that values of δ  used in calibration studies for the US include  287 . 0  (see Lansing (1998)), 
368 . 0  (see Guo and Lansing (1999)),  107 . 0  (see Ambler and Paquet (1996)), while Baier 
and Glomm (op cit) experiment with values of (0.15, 0.0075, 0) . 
                                                           
41 The variances are also bounded, in the sense that they cannot be negative.  Forcing the algorithm to take 
this property into account is straightforward: we maximize with respect to standard deviations and calculate 




To impose the above restrictions on  β α,  and δ , we use the GAUSS module for 
constrained maximum likelihood estimation version 1.0 (for a detailed description, see 
Schoenberg (1997)). Since the standard errors for the parameters have to allow for the 
possibility that the true values are near or actually on the constraint boundaries, we 
construct bootstrap confidence intervals at the 95 % level. 
 
4.  Econometric Results  
We next present the results of estimating the econometric model setout in Section 3 
(see Table 1) as well as the results of impulse response analysis (see Table 2 and Figures 1-
3).  Examination of the results in Table 1 reveals that all parameters are significantly 
different from zero and some interesting cross-country differences.  More specifically, the 
physical productivity of public production services relative to private capital, ( α − 1 ), is 
highest in Germany ( 309 . 0 ) followed by the US ( 279 . 0 ) and the UK ( 270 . 0 ). The 
difference between Germany and the UK is significant, but the US does not differ 
significantly from either country.  Estimates of the time discount rate, β , are  954 . 0 , 
978 . 0  and  986 . 0  for the US, Germany and the UK respectively and are all statistically 
significantly different from each other.  The estimates for the weight private consumers 
place on public consumption services relative to private consumption, δ , are  385 . 0 ,  475 . 0  
and  600 . 0  for the US, Germany and the UK respectively.  The UK and German results 
differ significantly from each other, while the US differs significantly from the UK but not 








Table 1: Estimation Results 
   United Kingdom  Germany  United States 


















q   0.5  - -  - - -  - - -  - 
α   0.20≤ 1-α  ≤  0.40  0.270  0.255 0.279 0.309 0.293 0.325 0.279  0.242 0.320
β   0.95 ≤ β  ≤  0.99  0.986  0.982 0.990 0.978 0.973 0.980 0.954  0.950 0.958
δ   0 ≤δ  ≤ 1  0.600  0.595 0.605 0.475 0.405 0.555 0.385  0.314 0.510
ρ     0.961  0.934 0.991 0.918 0.882 0.956 0.889  0.863 0.929
θ     0.277  0.262 0.289 0.318 0.301 0.336 0.297  0.261 0.338
b     0.972  0.966 0.980 0.970 0.959 0.976 0.941  0.915 0.955
Log-
Likelihood 
  -2.946 -3.157 -5.428 
N    140 153 149 
Notes: Estimation method: constrained Maximum Likelihood (Gauss CML module Version 1.0); parameter restrictions are 
displayed in column 2. The 95% confidence intervals are based on 1000 re-samplings. 
 
We now turn to the estimated policy parameters reported in Table 1.  Persistence of 
political uncertainty, captured by ρ  in equation (11), is highest in the UK ( 961 . 0 ) 
followed by Germany ( 918 . 0 ) and the US ( 889 . 0 ).  The UK and German results do not 
statistically differ from each other, while the US differs significantly from the UK but not 
from Germany.   The estimates for the long-run values of the optimal tax rate (θ ) and the 
optimal share of total tax revenues allocated to public production services relative to 
consumption ones (b ) are all within the ranges predicted by the theory (see equations 
(13a-13b)).  Specifically, the long-run tax rates are  277 . 0 ,  297 . 0  and  318 . 0  for the UK, 
the US and Germany respectively. The British and German tax rates (θ ) are statistically 
different from each other, but the US does not differ from either of the European countries.  
Finally, the optimal long-run share of tax revenues allocated to public production services 
(b ) is  941 . 0 ,  970 . 0  and  972 . 0  for the US, Germany and the UK respectively.
42  The 
British and German values are not significantly different from each other, while the US 
differs from both the UK and Germany.  
                                                           
42 The estimated long-run values of b , although consistent with the theory (see equation (13b)), seem to be 
too high.  However, recall that here the engine of perpetual economic growth is public production services as 




To more fully assess the persistence of fluctuations resulting from a change in the 
probability of being reelected (q), as well as the effects on the steady-state values of the 
endogenous variables, we next undertake impulse response analysis.  To do so, we analyze 
a temporary positive unit shock to q ˆ . Results are reported in Table 2.     
Table 2: Summary Impulse Response Results 
  United Kingdom  Germany  United States 




















estimated q ˆ  
0.963  0.221 1.660 0.333 0.126 0.582 0.179  0.145 0.221
Long-run 
response of  y ˆ   0.375  0.107 0.838 0.355 0.184 0.640 0.933  0.464 1.547
t
*  17.424  10.152 76.670 8.102 5.520 15.404  5.891  4.704 9.412
Notes:  t
* : time (quarters) in which the initial shock to q ˆ halves ( ) ln( / ) 5 . 0 ln( * ρ = t ). The responses of y ˆ  are based on a 
unit shock to  q ˆ . 
 
As predicted by the theory, Figures 1-3 show that the endogenous policy 
instruments θ ˆ and b ˆ  move in opposite directions.  Specifically, in all three countries, as a 
result of a temporary rise in q ˆ , θ ˆ  decreases before monotonically increasing to its steady 
state (i.e. zero), whereas b ˆ  increases prior to decreasing to its steady state deviation of 
zero.  The confidence bands also suggest that these changes (as well as all changes 
reported in Figures 1-3) are statistically significant for the duration of the simulation.   
 
Turning to effects of a temporary rise in the re-election probability upon 
macroeconomic outcomes, we can see for all countries that private consumption and 
investment (c and i), as well as public investment (g ), all monotonically increase before 
converging to new balanced growth paths which are higher than their pre-shock paths.  On 
the other hand, public consumption (h) increases before monotonically decreasing to its 
                                                                                                                                                                                
tax bases and this can be achieved by relatively high b  and low θ . This is especially true in the long run 




new balanced growth path that is higher than the pre-shock one.
43  If we concentrate on 
output, the point estimates appear to indicate that long-run growth in the US is relatively 
most affected by the increase in the re-election probability.  For example, Figures 1-3 and 
Table 2 (see row 2) show that steady-state growth is about 0.4 points higher for the UK and 
Germany and nearly a point for the US.  However, closer inspection of the confidence 
bands in Table 2 indicates that there is no significant difference between these countries.  
Nonetheless, an increase in the probability of being re-elected has a statistically significant 
and positive effect on the steady-state growth rate of output for all countries.  Finally, to 
demonstrate the relative importance of the four components of output ( g i c , ,  and h) in the 
transmission of a shock to q ˆ  to output growth, Figure 4 contains a decomposition of the 
output growth response into the contributions of each component. 
 
Figure 1: Percentage Deviation Responses to a Unit Shock to q ˆ  
(United Kingdom) 
 
                                                           
43 Recall that this is a model of endogenous growth (an  AK  model).  This means that even temporary shocks 
in fiscal policy can have permanent effects on levels and growth rates (see also e.g. King and Rebelo (1990), 























We now return to the issue pertaining to the persistence of shocks discussed in 
relation to the estimates of ρ  in Table 1.  Table 2 (see row 3) shows the time (in quarters) 
it takes for the initial shock to q ˆ  to half.  The point estimates suggest that it takes 
approximately 4 years for the UK, 2 years for Germany and 1.5 years for the US.
44  
Broadly speaking, this rank ordering is consistent with business cycle stylized facts, i.e. the 
US cycle is shorter, which is reflected in the lower modulus/higher damping that we find 
(see, e.g., Zarnowitz op cit. and Woitek op cit.). 
 
 
5. Conclusions   
 
This paper has solved and estimated a tractable dynamic stochastic general 
equilibrium model to study the link between elections, fiscal policy and 
                                                           




fluctuations/growth.  The model was formally estimated for Germany, the UK and the US, 
which are generally believed to be the economies closest to the neoclassical paradigm.  
The focus has been on the effects of electoral uncertainty and party competition upon the 
choice of fiscal policy instruments and in turn upon the macro-economy.  The main result 
is that electoral competition pushes governments to follow relatively short-sighted fiscal 
policies and this is detrimental for the macro-economy.  Our econometric results provide 
clear support for this proposition from both fluctuations and growth perspectives.  By 
explicitly modeling the channel through which political uncertainty affects the economy, 
we found a statistically significant effect of electoral uncertainty on output growth.  This 
effect is small in magnitude, which might help to explain why previous empirical studies 
can at best identify a political business cycle in policy instruments.   
 
Our research contributes to both the literature on political business cycles, as well 
as the quantitative RBC literature.  It adds to the former mainly because, to the extent that 
we formally estimate the solution of the theoretical model, we fill the gap between 
theoretical and empirical research.  To date, there has been very little econometric work, 
which has successfully made the formal link between political uncertainty, endogenous 
fiscal policy and ultimately aggregate outcomes.  Our research also adds to the RBC 
literature mainly because, instead of relying only on non-sample information, we combine 
this with observed data to obtain estimated values of a number of parameters which are of 
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7.1  Appendix A: Result 1  
This appendix solves for a Competitive Decentralized Equilibrium (CDE) as defined 
in the text. Note that the household’s problem is only a part of this CDE.  The log-linear 
objective (1a)-(1b), the Cobb-Douglas functional forms for the production function in (9) 
and government consumption services in (10d), and the assumption that policy instruments 
( t θ  and  t b ) are Markov, imply a value function of the form 
t t t t t t b u u k u u b k V 3 2 1 0 log ) , ; ( + + + = θ θ , where ( 3 2 1 0 , , , u u u u ) are time-invariant undetermined 
coefficients.  Substituting this conjecture for the value function into the optimality 
conditions (4a) and (4b), and using (7a) and (9), we get (10b).  Then, (10a) follows from 
(10b) and (2). See also e.g. McCallum (1989, equations (1.16-1.21) for a similar solution.  
  
We now have to solve for ( 3 2 1 0 , , , u u u u ) and verify our conjecture for the value 
function.  To do so, we substitute (10a), (10b) and (10d) back into (3) and equate 
coefficients on both sides of the Bellman.  For instance, by equating coefficients on  t k log , 









u .  Notice that  1 u  is the crucial coefficient; 
namely, it is the coefficient that matters for the optimal decisions, ( 1 , + t t k c ), in (4a)-(4b). 
The other undetermined coefficients ( 3 2 0 , , u u u ) may matter for the solution of the value 
function, but not for ( 1 , + t t k c ).  Hence, we will only sketch their solution here. To solve for 
( 3 2 0 , , u u u ), we need to contend with  t θ log , ) 1 log( t θ − ,  t b log  and  ) 1 log( t b −  [recall that 
we have substituted  (10a), (10b) and (10d) for  t c ,  1 + t k  and  t h  back into the Bellman in 
(3)].  To do so, we take first-order Taylor approximations of  t θ  and  t b  around their long-






log log θ θ
θ
θ θ − + ≅ t t ,  ) (
) 1 (
1




− − ≅ − t t  and similar 
expressions for  t b log  and  ) 1 log( t b − . Using these approximations into (3), and if the 
policy instruments ( t θ  and  t b ) are Markov, we can equate coefficients on both sides of the 
Bellman to get Riccati equations for ( 3 2 0 , , u u u ).  It is important to point out that those 
solutions for ( 3 2 0 , , u u u ) can be obtained only after we solve for optimal policy,  t θ  and  t b  
(see Appendix B below). This is how it should be, since this is a general equilibrium model 
in which policy instruments are chosen endogenously [see also Economides et al. (2003)]. 
By contrast, if policy were exogenous, we could simply assume (exogenous) statistical 
processes driving  t θ  and  t b  over time. This also verifies (approximately) our conjecture 
for the value function.  
 
7.2  Appendix B: Result 2  
We conjecture that the two value functions in (12a)-(12b) take the form 
() t t




P P q u k u u 2 1 0 log + + =  and  ( ) t t




N N q u k u u 2 1 0 log + + = , where 
(
N N N P P P u u u u u u 2 1 0 2 1 0 , , , , , ) are time-invariant undetermined coefficients.  Party  j  solves a 
symmetric problem, so that we have two pairs of equations like (12a)-(12b).  We will solve 
party i’s problem.  If we use the above conjectures into (12a)-(12b), differentiate the right-
hand side of (12a) with respect to the controls 
i
t θ  and 
i
t b , and impose the ex post 








t b b b ≡ = , 
P Pj Pi u u u ≡ =  and 
N Nj Ni u u u ≡ = , then the first-
order conditions for θt and  t b  in a symmetric Nash equilibrium in Markov strategies are 




t t q E u q E u E β .  
 
We now have to solve for (
N N N P P P u u u u u u 2 1 0 2 1 0 , , , , , ) and verify our conjecture for the 




(10b) and (10d), and then equate coefficients on both sides of the two Bellman equations 
(12a)-(12b).  The crucial coefficients are 
N P u u 1 1 , .  Namely, these are the coefficients that 
solve  1 + Ωt t E  and hence matter in the solution for the optimal strategies in (13a)-(13b).  
Equating coefficients on  t k log  in (12a)-(12b), we obtain two Riccati equations, 
)] 1 ( [ 1 1 1 1 1 1 + + − + + + = t t
N
t t
P P q E u q E u u β δ  and  ] ) 1 ( [ 1 1 1 1 1 + + + − = t t
N
t t
P N q E u q E u u β , which 
can be solved for 
P u1  and 
N u1 . Their solution gives 
0
) 2 1 )( 1 (














t t q E
q E
E .  
 
The solution for the rest of undetermined coefficients (
N N P P u u u u 2 0 2 0 , , , ), and hence 
for the value functions, will be based on first-order Taylor approximations around long-run 
values. Notice that (
N N P P u u u u 2 0 2 0 , , , ) do not affect the optimal strategies, ( t t b , θ ), in (13a)-
(13b).  Since they are not of particular interest, we will only sketch their solution here. 
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 and q  denotes the long-run value of 
t q .  Working similarly and using (13b), we can get analogous approximations for  t b log  
and ) 1 log( t b − . This implies that  t θ log , ) 1 log( t θ − ,  t b log  and  ) 1 log( t b −  are linear 
functions of  1 + t tq E  only.  Also notice that  ) (
2
1 + t t q E ) ( 2 1
2 q q E q q t t − + ≅ + , where 
t t t q q q E ρ + = + 0 1 . Thus, we only have intercepts and terms with  t q  on the RHS of (12a)-




(12b) to get Riccati equations for (
N N P P u u u u 2 0 2 0 , , , ). This also verifies (approximately) our 
conjecture for the value functions.  
 
Notice that this also completes the solution of the competitive decentralized 
equilibrium in Appendix A.  This is because  t θ  (the same arguments apply to  t b ) on the 
LHS of the Bellman in (3) is a function of  1 + t tq E  and hence [since  t t t q q q E ρ + = + 0 1 ] a 
linear function of  t q , while  1 + t t E θ  on the RHS of (3) is a function of  2 + t tq E  and hence 
[since  t t t q q q E
2
0 2 ) 1 ( ρ ρ + + = + ] also a linear function of  t q . Accordingly, we can equate 
coefficients on both sides of the Bellman to solve for ( 3 2 0 , , u u u ) in the private agents’ 
problem.  
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